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11 Scepticism and Certainty:
Moore and Wittgenstein on
Common Sense and Philosophy
Duncan Pritchard
introductory remarks
How should we conceive of the relationship between common sense
and philosophy? This is a large question, but I want to suggest that we
can get at least one interesting angle on this topic by considering
a particular historical episode from early analytical philosophy. This
concerns the problem of radical scepticism, at least in one of its (now,
anyway) familiar guises.
In one corner we have G. E. Moore, who offers a distinctive
account of how we should handle dialectical standoffs between
philosophy and common sense, and who demonstrates the utility
of his proposal by appealing to common-sense certainties in order
to respond to philosophical concerns about our knowledge of an
external world. In the other corner we have Wittgenstein, who
rejects the Moorean account of common-sense certainties and
their supposed philosophical import. But that’s not because he
wants to defend a traditional viewpoint of a kind that Moore was
opposing with his common-sense philosophy. Wittgenstein instead
offers a kind of inversion of the Moorean position, a position that
accords our common-sense certainties a special role to play in our
epistemic practices – and thus in our dealings with philosophical
problems, such as radical scepticism – albeit in a very different
manner to that envisaged by Moore.
As we will see, this debate is more than just of historical inter-
est, since the two parties are outlining distinctive ways in which
a common-sense epistemology might be developed.
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moore on common sense and certainty
Common sense is a recurring motif throughout Moore’s philosoph-
ical corpus, but our interest here, for reasons that will become
apparent, is specifically with Moore’s treatment of certainty in the
context of our knowledge of an external world. The thread that
unites Moore’s work in this regard is the idea that our common-
sense certainties can be employed to push back against philosoph-
ical challenges to knowledge of this kind (from radical scepticism
and idealism), and hence constitute legitimate dialectical stopping
points in a philosophical debate.
In taking this general line,Moore is following in a philosophical
tradition, as exemplified most notably by Thomas Reid.1 Just as Reid
countered the sceptical themes of his day, as represented especially in
the work of Hume, by appealing to our common sense, soMoore does
likewise in response to the prevailing scepticism about the external
world of his day.2 There were two sources of the scepticism that
Moore was countering. The first was found in the idealism that was
prominent in British philosophy at the turn of the twentieth century.3
The second was the new forms of (indirect) realism regarding percep-
tual knowledge and experience that were being developed in the early
twentieth century in response to such idealism, which make our
knowledge/experience of the world essentially indirect and mediated
by ‘sense-data’. These latter views are notmeant to be sceptical about
the external world in the way that idealism is, but by making our
knowledge of an external world indirect they inevitably generate
sceptical worries of this kind regardless.4
Moore’s response to these philosophical proposals that call our
knowledge of the external world into questionwas to insist that since
common sense tells us that we do have external-world knowledge, so
it follows that there must be something amiss with the philosophical
reasoning in play. When common sense and philosophy conflict, that
is, the former always has priority. But what kind of priority didMoore
have in mind?
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Thefirst thing to notice in this regard is thatMoore doesn’t hold
that our common-sense beliefs are always true or that they are inher-
ently epistemically justified, much less that they are immune to
revision. It follows that we do not automatically have knowledge of
these common-sense claims either. Nonetheless, what does seem
clear is thatMoore holds that common-sense claims have an intrinsic
credibility that ensures that they are dialectically privileged relative
to philosophical claims that oppose them.
Moreover, Moore also holds that the special status of these
claims relates to the certainty with which we endorse them. In par-
ticular, our everyday common-sense convictions enjoy a certainty
that philosophical theses lack. Accordingly, he maintains that
where the two conflict it would be more reasonable to retain one’s
common-sense claims than to instead endorse the opposing philo-
sophical position. Indeed, he also seems to want to say that the degree
of certainty in play here is important, in that when it comes to those
everyday common-sense claims of which we are optimally certain, it
would be especially reasonable to retain one’s conviction in the
everyday claim rather than accede to the philosophical alternative.
In fact, it was these optimally certain everyday claims (in nor-
mal conditions anyway), and the special epistemic standing that they
have as a result, that most interested Moore. Call these Moorean
certainties. He presented a long list of Moorean certainties, the
most famous of which was of course that one has hands, but which
also included such claims as that one is not currently completely
naked, and that the earth has existed for many years before one was
born.5 Presumably Moore holds that it is possible that we can be in
error even here, though when it comes to these Moorean certainties
he seems to want to claim that we simply cannot make sense of them
being false (even though theymight be). At the very least, the idea that
philosophy might call them into question is rejected, as Moore main-
tains that it would always be more reasonable to maintain the
Moorean certainty over any philosophical thesis that conflicted
with it, given that the latter would inevitably be less certain. Here is
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Moore, talking about philosophical views that challenge our know-
ledge of the external world:
it seems to me a sufficient refutation of such views . . . simply to
point to cases in which we do know such things. This, after all, you
know, really is afinger: there is no doubt about it. I know it, and you
all know it. And I thinkwemay safely challenge any philosopher to
bring forward any argument in favour either of the proposition that
we do not know it, or of the proposition that it is not true, which
does not at some point rest upon some premise which is, beyond
comparison, less certain than is the propositionwhich it is designed
to attack. (Moore 1918–19: 8)
Another crucial element toMoore’s common-sense approach to
these matters is to explicitly eschew the burden of explaining how
one has knowledge of theseMoorean certainties. That is,Moore holds
that the foregoing demonstrates that it is more rational to endorse
these Moorean certainties (and so regard them as known) than to be
swayed by the opposing philosophical considerations (which purport
to call such knowledge into question), even if one lacks an account of
how these Moorean certainties amount to knowledge. Relatedly, one
can legitimately reject these opposing philosophical claims even if
one cannot explain exactly what is amiss with them. Indeed,Moore is
even willing to grant that he finds the opposing philosophical claims
credible. He famously contends that our situation with regard to
scepticism about our knowledge of the external world is essentially
a matter of one person’s modus ponens being the other person’s
modus tollens, with plausible antecedents on either side (see espe-
cially Moore 1959a). But still he insists that it can be reasonable to
reject these philosophical claims if they conflict with common sense,
and hence embrace the antecedent of the conditional that goes along
with our common-sense convictions.
Moore is effectively conceding here that his philosophical
opponent has problematized the type of knowledge in question.
There is, even by Moore’s own lights, a standing challenge to
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explaining how our knowledge of the external world is possible. Moore
is content to allow thathe cannotmeet this challenge, but hemaintains
that he doesn’t need tomeet it in order to reasonably insist that one has
the knowledge in question. This is because he maintains that we can
know thingswithout being in a position to explain howweknowthem,
much less being able to prove thatwe know them. Indeed, he even goes
so far as to grant thatwe can legitimatelymaintainwe have knowledge
even if we cannot cite any specific evidence in support of the propos-
ition inquestion, and even in the contextof a philosophical challenge to
that knowledge. In fact, Moore concedes that a lack of evidence of this
kind is often the casewhen it comes to theseMoorean certainties.Here
he is talking about his knowledge of the common-sense claim that the
earth has existed for many years before he was born:
I certainly know this because I have known other things in the past
which were evidence for it. And I certainly do not know exactly
what the evidence was. Yet all this seems to me to be no good
reason for doubting that I do know it. We are all, I think, in this
strange position that we do know many things, with regard to
which we know further that we must have had evidence for them,
and yet we do not know how we know them, i.e., we do not know
what the evidence was. (Moore 1925: 45)
Notice that Moore isn’t saying that we lack evidence for these com-
mon-sense certainties. Instead, he maintains that we do have such
evidence. And yet it is also the case, according to Moore, that we are
unable to identify what this evidence is.
A further feature of Moore’s treatment of these Moorean cer-
tainties, one that is often overlooked, is that he clearly thought that
their certainty is completely unaffected by our engagement with the
philosophical challenge that is posed to them. So discovering that
there is a standing, and credible, philosophical puzzle about our
knowledge of the external world, and coming to recognize that one
cannot explain how one has this knowledge or even what specific
evidence supports that knowledge, is compatible with one continuing
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to be, quite reasonably, just as certain of the truth of these proposi-
tions as before. Indeed, this much is clear fromMoore’s own reaction
to the philosophical argument in play. His point is not just that those
who haven’t engagedwith these challenges are entitled to their know-
ledge of these certainties even while lacking a grip on how this
knowledge comes about or on what evidentially supports it. Rather,
he further claims that even those who, like him, have engaged with
these challenges and come to see their plausibility are nonetheless
entitled to be no less certain that they have the knowledge in ques-
tion. This is a quite remarkable stance, and goes well beyond the
general idea behind a common-sense philosophical methodology
such that common-sense claims should be privileged over philosoph-
ical challenges to them.
Moore’s common-sense response to external-world scepticism
is thus quite radical. It is not just that common sense is a kind of
dialectical deal-breaker when it comes to a philosophical impasse, or
even that common-sense claims have an inherent (albeit defeasible)
epistemic pedigree on account of their certainty. Moore goes further
to contend that we are entitled to these common-sense claims even if
we recognize the force of the opposing philosophical argument and
even if we recognize that we lack an account of how we can have the
knowledge of these common-sense claims that we take ourselves to
have. Indeed, even if we recognize that we cannot identify the eviden-
tial basis for this knowledge, it is nonetheless rational to continue to
endorse them, and be no less certain of them.
wittgenstein on certainty and scepticism
Wittgenstein’sfinal notebooks, published asOnCertainty, are centrally
concerned with the status of Moorean certainties.6 Wittgenstein agrees
that they play a special role in our practices, but he doesn’t understand
this role along the same lines thatMoore did. In particular, whileMoore
holds that the optimal certainty that attaches to these propositions
ensures that they have a special rational status, Wittgenstein holds
that they have no rational standing at all.7 Even so, he agrees with
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Moore about the importance of these common-sense certaintieswhen it
comes todealingwithchallenges toourknowledgeof theexternalworld.
Wethushave twoverydifferentconceptionsof the roleof commonsense
in philosophical methodology in play, with Moore representing
a contemporary twist on the common-sense philosophical tradition
and Wittgenstein presenting, in contrast, something much more
iconoclastic.
The source of the divergence betweenMoore and Wittgenstein
when it comes to these Moorean certainties is a radical difference in
how they each take these certainties to relate to other, more mun-
dane, everyday claims that we take ourselves to know. Right now, for
example, I take myself to know that my car is parked outside my
house. But while I take myself to know this, it is clearly not
a proposition that is optimally certain, and much less is it the kind
of claim that could play any kind of dispute-settling role in
a philosophical debate. Interestingly, it is also something that I not
only think that I know, but which I could easily tell you how I know
(I remember parking the car there earlier, and have no reason for
thinking that it has been moved since). Relatedly, I would have no
problem articulating what evidence I had in support of this belief.
Moore effectively treats the relationship between the Moorean
certainties and these mundane everyday claims as merely a matter of
degree, where the former is simply more certain than the latter. We
noted earlier that while Moore grants that we often can’t identify the
evidential basis of these Moorean certainties, he also held that one
could not reasonably doubt that they were known, and thus that they
did enjoy an adequate evidential basis. Moore seems to think that the
fact that the evidential support for these Moorean certainties is not
easily identifiable is merely a by-product of their common-sense
status, in that they are so familiar and long-standing that it is under-
standable that their original evidential basis should now be long
forgotten.
Wittgenstein takes a strikingly different line in this regard. He
maintains that the optimal certainty that is associated with these
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Moorean certainties means that we can make no sense of there being
rational support in their favour (or against them, for that matter). In
this regard they are very unlike our ordinary mundane claims to
knowledge, where evidence for or against them can easily be mar-
shalled. Wittgenstein focuses, in this regard, on the Moorean cer-
tainty that one has two hands. He writes:
My having two hands is, in normal circumstances, as certain as
anything that I could produce in evidence for it.
That is why I am not in a position to take the sight of my hand as
evidence for it. (Wittgenstein 1969: § 250)
The point is that the optimal certainty that applies to these Moorean
certainties far outstrips any evidential basis that we could provide for
them. Rather than this showing that there is something epistemically
amiss with these certainties, however, Wittgenstein instead claims
that it highlights the special role that they play in our epistemic
practices, one that by its nature excludes them from rational evalu-
ation altogether.
This point is further brought out by considering what doubt of
a Moorean certainty would involve. Consider this passage:
If a blind man were to ask me ‘Have you got two hands?’ I should
not make sure by looking. If I were to have any doubt of it, then
I don’t know why I should trust my eyes. For why shouldn’t I test
my eyes by looking tofind outwhether I seemy two hands?What is
to be tested by what? (Wittgenstein 1969: § 125)
In normal circumstances, determining that one has two hands by
looking would be simply bizarre. Having hands is not like having
one’s keys in one’s pocket, where one might verify their existence
by looking for them. Wittgenstein is again emphasizing the differ-
ences between Moorean certainties and our everyday knowledge
claims, in that the former are nodes of a general backdrop of certainty
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against which our rational practices – and in particular our practices
of offering reasons for and against propositions – take place.
This is why the Moorean certainties are characterized by
Wittgenstein as having a ‘hinge’ status, and why the propositional
attitude in play is often referred to as a hinge commitment. Consider
this famous passage:
[T]he questions that we raise and our doubts depend upon the fact
that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like
hinges on which those turn.
That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific
investigations that certain things are in deed not doubted.
But it isn’t that the situation is like this: We just can’t
investigate everything, and for that reason we are forced to rest
content with assumption. If I want the door to turn, the hinges
must stay put. (Wittgenstein 1969: §§ 341–3)
Wittgenstein’s point is that it is this backdrop of certainty that
enables rational evaluation to take place. Rather than the optimal
certainty associated with the Moorean certainties reflecting the fact
that they enjoy a special level of rational support, it instead reveals
how they are immune to rational evaluation since they constitute the
framework relative to which rational evaluation occurs. As such they
can be neither rational nor irrational (and hence are a-rational).
This last point is especially important to understanding
Wittgenstein’s account of hinge commitments. As he puts it in the
passage just cited, it is not as if the hinge commitments are mere
assumptions that we could rationally discharge. Indeed, they are not
assumptions at all, since there is nothing remotely hypothetical about
our commitment to them. On the contrary, Wittgenstein emphasizes
how such certainty is rooted in our actions rather than being the
result of ratiocination, how it is primitive, visceral, ‘animal’.8
Relatedly, it is not as if we could imagine a system of rational evalu-
ation that lacked a-rational hinge commitments. Wittgenstein
explains why by showing how the very idea of a universal rational
moore and wittgenstein on common sense and philosophy 255
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evaluation –whether negative (sceptical) or positive (anti-sceptical) – is
simply incoherent. As he remarks at one point (Wittgenstein 1969:
§ 450): ‘A doubt that doubted everything would not be a doubt.’ One
needs somewhere to stand, from a rational point of view, in order to
rationally doubt, and that constrains the scope of the doubt.
Wittgenstein’s insight was to recognize that what needs to be kept in
place are our basic certainties, and that this is a point that cuts both
ways. It is not just doubt that requires a backdrop of certainty, but belief
too. That which cannot be rationally doubted cannot be rationally
believed either. But the attempt to rationally doubt, or rationally sup-
port, a hinge commitment is tantamount to undertaking a universal
rational evaluation. Although the propositions in play look mundane,
their optimal certainty reflects the fact that they are codifying our
fundamental relationship to the world. If, in normal conditions, I am
wrong about whether I have hands, then everything is called into
question (in contrast, for example, to being wrong about whether
I have my keys in my pocket).
This is also whyWittgenstein is so keen to highlight the oddity
of the way in which Moore enumerates these Moorean certainties
(see, e.g.,Wittgenstein 1969: § 6).Moore clearly thinks that inmaking
these claims explicit he is simply highlighting some ordinary com-
mitments that we hold which are especially certain. As noted above,
he doesn’t think there is any difference of kind in play when it comes
to these Moorean certainties, in contrast to their more mundane
counterpart everyday claims that are not optimally certain. But
Wittgenstein shows us that the special status of these hinge commit-
ments is revealed in our normal epistemic practices, and in particular
in how these commitments are usually entirely tacit. Wittgenstein
notes that we are not taught hinge commitments, but that we instead
‘swallow them down’with the specific claims that we are taught (see
Wittgenstein 1969: § 143). (For example, we are not taught that we
have hands, but only how to do things with our hands.) Relatedly, we
do not normally even notice these hinge commitments, as they ‘lie
apart from the route travelled by enquiry’ (see Wittgenstein 1969: §
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88). It takes an unusual philosophical context, such as the one that
Moore is engaged in, in order to make these certainties explicit. In
stating theMoorean certainties as he does, as if they are essentially no
different from other empirical claims that he believes he knows,
Moore is thus failing to recognize the distinctive role that they play
in our epistemic practices.
wittgenstein on common sense
Wittgenstein thus offers a kind of ‘inversion’ of theMoorean picture.
Whereas Moore holds that the optimal certainty enjoyed by the
Moorean certainties means that they have a special rational status
that enables them to be a dialectical stopping point in
a philosophical dispute, Wittgenstein maintains that their optimal
certainty in fact excludes them fromhaving any rational status at all.
Does thatmean thatWittgenstein is an opponent of a common-sense
philosophical methodology? I think that drawing this conclusion
would be far too quick, for one could just as well regard
Wittgenstein as developing a more refined version of a common-
sense philosophical methodology.
In particular, Wittgenstein isn’t disputing Moore’s claim that
these common-sense certainties play an important philosophical role.
Rather, his point is that Moore has misunderstood their nature.
Wittgenstein’s criticism of Moore in this regard mirrors a broader
critique that he offers of philosophy – a recurring theme in his earlier
Philosophical Investigations – in terms of how it misuses our every-
day language and, in the process, manufactures illusory philosophical
puzzles that trade on this misuse of language (see Wittgenstein 1953).
Moore misuses language by thinking that he can simply enumerate
theseMoorean certainties as if they were just like any other mundane
empirical claim. In doing so, he fails to see their true significance.
Notice too how the conception of rational evaluation that
Wittgenstein offers, which has hinge commitments at its heart,
offers a much more powerful way of dealing with the sceptical
problem than that proposed by Moore. One of the standard
moore and wittgenstein on common sense and philosophy 257
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criticisms of a common-sense philosophical methodology like
Moore’s is why we should privilege common sense over philosophy,
particularly when (as in Moore’s case) we are offered no explanation
for why the common-sense claim is true (and it is even granted that
the opposing philosophical claim appears credible).9 Wittgenstein’s
approach is not merely to accurately describe our epistemic prac-
tices and maintain that this correct description by itself should
suffice to resolve the sceptical problem. Instead, he provides us
with a compelling diagnosis of where the sceptical reasoning goes
awry.
We can bring this point into sharper relief by comparing
Wittgenstein’s anti-scepticism with the kind of ordinary-language
approach to the sceptical problem exemplified by J. L. Austin
(another philosopher who could arguably lay claim to being part of
the common-sense philosophical tradition). Like Wittgenstein,
Austin also highlights how very different our everyday epistemic
practices are when compared with the epistemic practices described
by the radical sceptic (and also, for that matter, by philosophers
attempting to deal with the sceptical problem; see, e.g., Austin
1961a). But as Barry Stroud (1984) powerfully argued, merely noting
this difference is of dubious import to radical scepticism. This is
because the radical sceptic can persuasively contend that what she is
doing is presenting a purified version of our everyday epistemic
practices – that is, once we strip away everything that is extraneous
to those practices. After all, it is surely not contentious that in
ordinary epistemic contexts our practices are influenced by all
kinds of considerations – lack of imagination, lack of time, and so
on – that have no bearing on the epistemic standing of our beliefs.10 If
that’s true, however, then our ‘purified’ everyday epistemic prac-
tices might well be rather different to our actual everyday epistemic
practices, and yet nonetheless be properly rooted in them. The rad-
ical sceptic could thus employ distinct epistemic practices while
even so maintaining that she wasn’t doing anything that wasn’t
licenced by our ordinary ways of conducting rational evaluations.
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Wittgenstein’s anti-scepticism blocks off even this style of
response, however. For he demonstrates that the differences between
the philosophical (i.e., sceptical/traditional anti-sceptical) description
of our epistemic practices and our actual epistemic practices cannot be
captured in this manner. This is because the former, far from being an
extension (or purified version) of the latter, is in fact simply incoherent.
We are not ignorant for lacking rational support for our hinge commit-
ments, since there could be no such thing. To aspire for such would be
to aspire for universal rational evaluations, and Wittgenstein has
argued that this is impossible. We are consequently not lacking, from
an epistemic point of view, in being unable to undertake them, any
more than we are lacking, from an artistic point of view, in being
unable to draw a realistic circle-square.11
The style of response that Wittgenstein is offering to the scep-
tical problem is thus very different to that attempted by Moore. In
particular, Wittgenstein is showing how, by attending to the relevant
features of our epistemic practices and characterizing them correctly,
we can diagnose the philosophical confusion that is generating this
puzzle. This is the sense in which what Wittgenstein is presenting is
an undercutting anti-sceptical strategy, in that he is showing how
what can seem like a genuine philosophical conundrum is in fact
nothing of the kind. This is in contrast to the kind of overriding anti-
sceptical strategy that Moore’s style of common-sense line offers us.
For remember that even while embracing the common-sense alterna-
tive, Moore nonetheless grants that he cannot explain where the
sceptic(/idealist) goes awry or even explain how the contested know-
ledge is possible. Accordingly, he cannot possibly be in a position to
offer an undercutting diagnosis of this problem.
This aspect of theMoorean line is apt to be overlooked because of
how Moore presents the dialectic as being a clash between common
sense and a philosophical position. This is in part because a significant
element of what is driving his concern with our knowledge of the
external world is the challenge to this knowledge posed by idealism,
and that is of course a philosophical stance (indeed, a fairly popular one,
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in British philosophical circles at any rate, at the time he was writing).
Radical scepticism, however, is best understood as a putative paradox,
in the sense of a series of claims that look independently plausible –
indeed, which seem to be rooted in our everyday practices – but which
are collectively inconsistent. Radical scepticism as a position, after all,
doesn’t seem all that credible. Can we really make sense of someone
who claims to doubt everything, and therefore doesn’t know anything?
(And why would we listen to the arguments offered by such a person?)
But a paradox is a very different dialectical beast. In particular, in
proposing a paradox one is not thereby committed to specifying
which of the claims that make up the paradox should be rejected. So
while radical scepticism as a position might be committed to main-
taining that external-world knowledge is impossible, radical scepti-
cism as a paradox can merely note how such knowledge is
inconsistentwith other independently plausible claims thatwe hold.12
Insofar asMoore is dealingwith radical scepticism qua position,
it seems perfectly reasonable to insist on common sense rather than
embrace the radical sceptical conclusion, particularly if one grants
that the two stances are in the dialectical impasse that Moore
describes. With the debate so construed, it might not seem to be all
that significant that Moore is unable to diagnose where the radical
sceptic’s reasoning goes awry or explain how external-world know-
ledge is possible after all. But this dialectical line is far less credible
when cast against radical scepticism qua paradox. This is because
Moore’s common-sense response effectively leaves the paradox
entirely intact, since he doesn’t offer any theoretical diagnosis of
what is amiss with it. But how then could the appeal to common
sense possibly offer us any philosophical comfort in our dealings with
this paradox? In effect, all it tells us is that there is a genuine paradox
concerning our knowledge of the external world but that common
sense assures us that we do have such knowledge. If anything, doesn’t
that simply exacerbate the mystery regarding our external-world
knowledge, rather than do anything to remove it?13
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concluding remarks
What does this contrast between Moore’s and Wittgenstein’s
approaches to the problem of external-world knowledge tell us
about appeals to common sense in philosophy? I think there are two
broad conclusions that we can reach, which are intersecting in
important ways. The first is that there are limits to the kind of
philosophical satisfaction that we can achieve by simply appealing
to common sense in the way thatMoore did, without also at the same
time offering an undercutting theoretical diagnosis of the philosoph-
ical puzzle in play. This is especially sowhen it comes to paradoxes (in
contrast to challenges posed by philosophical positions), where mere
appeals to common sense of this sort seem to offer no philosophical
comfort whatsoever.
The second conclusion is that we cannot take common-sense
claims at face value in the way thatMoore supposes. In particular, the
very articulation of common sense, far from being a straightforward
task, requires philosophical acumen. Moore thought that his presen-
tation of these Moorean certainties as articles of common sense was
entirely unproblematic. But while he was right that they do tell us
something about the fundamental nature of our everyday practices,
their articulation in this manner in fact served to obscure their philo-
sophical import. Far from being akin to ordinary empirical claims that
happen to be optimally certain, they are in fact claims that play
a distinctive role in our epistemic practices – one that is normally
entirely tacit, and for good reason (as these claims provide the frame-
work for these practices and hence are not themselves subject to that
framework).
These two conclusions are intersecting because they each have
a bearing on the other. Moore’s failure to properly characterize our
common-sense commitments lies at the source of his inability to
diagnose where the radical sceptical puzzle goes awry. Conversely,
any theoretical diagnosis of the sceptical problem of a kind that can
undercut this puzzle will involve a philosophical account of what
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constitutes our common-sense commitments in this regard, and will
not simply involve a bare endorsement of them.
BothMoore andWittgenstein treat our everyday practices – and
thus the everyday epistemic practices that presently concern us – as
holding the key to resolving philosophical puzzles. In this broad sense
they are both common-sense philosophers. But we have also seen that
their approaches to dealing with philosophical puzzles are import-
antly different. Whereas the Moorean common-sense philosophical
methodology holds that we can unproblematically identify common-
sense claims and then straightforwardly employ them to resolve
philosophical disputes, the Wittgensteinian philosophical method-
ology is much subtler. What might strike the philosopher as articles
of common sense ought to be interrogated, and that requires philo-
sophical acumen. In undertaking such an exercise, the philosopher is
able to tease out the genuine features of our everyday practices from
the theoretical claims that are imported into our descriptions of these
practices by the philosopher. In doing so, she is able to unravel the
problematic reasoning that led to the philosophical puzzle in
hand.14,15
notes
1 In the last century the foremost exponent of this tradition, besides Moore
himself, was probably Chisholm – see, for example, his famous defence of
particularism as a response to the problem of the criterion in Chisholm
(1977). For discussion of Chisholm’s common-sense philosophical meth-
odology, see Lemos (2004).
2 See Reid ((1764) 1997). For further discussion of Reid’s common-sense
philosophical methodology, and its particular application to Hume’s writ-
ings, see Lemos (2004; 2020) and McAllister (2016).
3 For an overview of the main trends in so-called British idealism, see Brooks
(2017). Of course, idealism is sometimes presented as a way of responding
to scepticism about the external world.
4 See in particular Moore’s (1918–19) discussion of Russell’s account of
perceptual experience and knowledge. Unhelpfully, Moore doesn’t
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specify which material by Russell he has in mind in this regard, but it is
likely to be Russell (1914). Note that Moore (e.g., 1953b) himself
endorses a kind of sense-datum theory, though he seems inclined to
regard such a notion as picking out features of the world rather than
one’s perceptual experiences. Sense-datum theory, so construed, is
obviously not committed to an indirect realism about perceptual
experience (much less perceptual knowledge).
5 See, respectively, Moore (1939); Moore (1959a); and Moore (1925).
6 Published asWittgenstein (1969). Note that granting that these notebooks
are primarily concerned with Moorean certainties does not entail that
Moore’s work is the overarching focus of these writings as is often sup-
posed. In fact, there are good reasons to think that Newman ((1870) 1979),
which is also concerned with certainties of this kind, was also an import-
ant influence on these notebooks. For discussion of this point, see Kienzler
(2006) and Pritchard (2015b).
7 Note that, following our two protagonists, I will be using the notions of
evidence and reasons interchangeably. I think there are in fact crucial
differences between these two notions, but since they are not relevant to
our purposes here we can reasonably set them to one side.
8 Here isWittgenstein (1969: § 359): ‘I want to conceive [of this certainty] as
something that lies beyond being justified or unjustified; as it were, as
something animal.’
9 See Lemos (2008) for further discussion of this kind of criticism of Moore.
10 I am here setting aside the question of pragmatic encroachment in epis-
temology. For further discussion of this topic, see Fantl and McGrath
(2010).
11 This is why it is misleading to simply describe us as lacking knowledge
of Moorean certainties, as that implies that they are in the market for
knowledge (and thus that we are ignorant of them), which is not the
case. For some of the key interpretations of Wittgenstein’s treatment of
radical scepticism in On Certainty (where this includes works that
offer epistemological theses broadly inspired by this work), see
McGinn (1989); Williams (1991); Moyal-Sharrock (2004); Wright
(2004b); Coliva (2010; 2015); and Schönbaumsfeld (2016). I offer my
own interpretive line in this regard in Pritchard (2015a). For a recent
survey of contemporary work on Wittgensteinian epistemology, see
Pritchard (2017).
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12 For further discussion of the idea of radical scepticism as a paradox as
opposed to a position, and the dialectical important of this distinction, see
Pritchard (2015a: part I).
13 The distinction between the problem of radical scepticism and idealism as
two ways of calling our external-world knowledge into question is also
important to understanding On Certainty. In particular, the first of the
four notebooks that make up this work seems primarily devoted to the
problem of idealism (and hence is mostly concerned withMoore’s proof of
an external world), with the other three notebooks primarily concerned
with the sceptical problematic (and hence more concerned with the more
general issue of the status of theMoorean certainties). Crucially, however,
Wittgenstein’s hinge epistemology seems to be directed at the latter rather
than the former. This is because he treats attempts to even state idealism
(or realism, for that matter, construed now as the rejection of idealism),
such as a statement like ‘There are physical objects’, as being, unlike
hinges, simply nonsense – see, for example, Wittgenstein (1969: § 35). For
more on this point, see Williams (2004) and Pritchard (2015a: chapter 4).
14 Note that this is the sense in which a distinctively Wittgensteinian
philosophical quietism is very different from a straightforward form of
philosophical quietism that simply eschews philosophical puzzles, and
thus philosophy, altogether. The conundrums that we are led into by
faulty philosophical reasoning can only be unravelled by further philoso-
phy. In this sense, philosophy is both the cause of, and the solution to,
philosophical problems. For more on Wittgensteinian quietism, see
McDowell (2009). For a contemporary discussion of varieties of philo-
sophical quietismmore generally, see Virvidakis (2006). See also Pritchard
(2020), where I draw parallels between Wittgenstein’s brand of quietism
and Pyrrhonian scepticism (which is very different from the broadly
Cartesian scepticism that has been our concern here).
15 Thanks to Rik Peels and René van Woudenberg for detailed comments on
an earlier version of this chapter.
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